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INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 1868 in Charleston, South Carolina, an integrated
group of citizens-about seventy-five African American and fifty
White'-inaugurated the new year by convening to rewrite the state's
constitution. Out of the ashes of the Civil War, their task was to create "a
just and liberal Constitution, that will guarantee equal rights to all, regard-
less of race, color, or previous condition" of servitude.' Thus began
Reconstruction in South Carolina. Twenty-seven years later, convention
delegates reconvened to craft another state constitution.This time only six
of the nearly 170 delegates were African American. Now, the conven-
tion's explicit charge was to disenfranchise African American voters and
guarantee White supremacy. Thus began the reign ofJim Crow.
* Law clerk for the Honorable Roger L. Gregory, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. B.A. 1995,Yale University; M.A. (History) 20 0 1, University
of Virginia;J.D. 2001, University of Virginia School of Law.The author wishes to thank
Charles W McCurdy, Gary W Gallagher, Carl Bon Tempo, W Lewis Burke, and J. Clay
Smith for their comments on earlier versions of this project. And of course, this article
would not have been completed without the support and encouragement of the author's
wife, Katie.
1. James Lowell Underwood, African Auerican Foundint' Fathers: 7he Making of the
South Carolina Constitution of 1868, in AT FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING
FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 2 (James Lowell Under-
wood &W Lewis Burke,Jr. eds., Univ. of South Carolina Press 2000).
2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 6 (1868)
reprinted in 1 THIE AMERICAN NEGRO, His HISTORY AND LITERATURE 6 (1968) [hereinafter
CONVENTION]. These were the opening remarks of the Convention, as delivered by Dele-
gate Thomas J. Robertson of Richland.
3. EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION
289 (1992).
4. See id. at 288-89.
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Why Reconstruction failed to guarantee equal rights for African
American South Carolinians is a complicated question. Blame can be doled
out to a bevy of diverse groups-war-weary Northerners, an apathetic
federal government, "unreconstructed" Confederates. Added to these
traditional targets, however, must be South Carolina's African American
leadership, which fractured during key moments of Reconstruction,
thereby weakening their own political power and emboldening their
enemies.
A fundamental feature of their division was a disagreement on ques-
tions of law. Jurisprudential conflicts were more than just legal quibbles-
they were vital struggles over what a just and unbiased government would
mean. In addressing these matters, South Carolina's African American leg-
islators and lawyers often looked to Jonathan Jasper Wright, the nation's
first African American state supreme court justice and South Carolina's
highest-ranking African American official. Wright was a strict, legal for-
ralist who narrowly interpreted the law based on history and precedent.
This perspective, combined with his cautious, political bias, limited his
willingness to advocate for progressive measures to aid the freed slaves or
support punitive measures aimed at the former rebels. Instead, as a mem-
ber of the Republican party's conservative bloc, Wright hoped for a
peaceful, long-lasting coalition of Whites and African Americans.
Opposing Wright was William James Whipper, a controversial mem-
ber of the state legislature and Wright's intra-party nemesis.' Whipper led
a group of Radical Republican pragmatists who focused on immediate,
political victories. Like many other Radicals,Whipper continually pressed
for initiatives to aid the newly-freed slaves, and against legislation to bene-
fit the former Confederates. When Wright won election to the supreme
court in 1870, it was Whipper whom he narrowly defeated. Had Whipper
won that position, he likely would have brought a more progressive voice
to the high court than Wright.
Part I of this article, on the historiography of South Carolina
Reconstruction, explains the difficulty scholars have had in uncovering the
documentary history of Reconstruction, and outlines the development of
historical interpretations of Reconstruction from the Nineteenth century
Redeemer-era accounts to the revisionists of the 1970's. Part II provides
brief biographies of both Justice Wright and William James Whipper. Parts
Ill and IV track the different approaches ofWhipper and Wright on two
vital issues of their day: (1) whether to repudiate all private debts relating
to slavery; and (2) how to construct a homestead law to protect cash-poor
landowners. Finally, the article concludes that if Wright had taken
5. See Richard Gergel & Belinda Gergel, "To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden":
Associate Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina, in AT FREEDOM'S
DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH
CAROLINA 44 (James Lowell Underwood & W Lewis Burke, Jr. eds., Univ. of South
Carolina Press 2000).
[VOL. 8:471
SPRING 2003] Obligations !npaired 473
Whipper's more -aggressive tact in his judicial opinions and political
activity, the story of South Carolina Reconstruction might have evolved
differently. African Americans might have retained some of their political
voice as memories of Reconstruction faded into the past.
I. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SOUTH CAROLINA RECONSTRUCTION
Before criticizing Justice Wright for his cautious politics, it is worth
pausing to recognize that for decades historians failed to even discuss his
achievements at all.The historiography of Reconstruction in South Caro-
lina began with early, racist accounts that attempted either to "erase black
officials from the historical record altogether" 6 or to fabricate tales of"the
nightmare of Negro rule," when ignorant African Americans, corrupt car-
petbaggers, and traitorous scalawags took control of the Palmetto state.7
According to these historians, terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux
Klan were formed solely because of the "absolute helplessness of the
[White] minority."' Any violence that occurred, it was claimed, happened
because of the "provocation given the white population ... [by] the in-
stantaneous assembling of hundreds of armed negroes ..... By
propagating myths of Reconstruction as they wished to see it, Redeemer-
era historians seriously distorted the memory of South Carolina Recon-
struction. African American accomplishments were ridiculed or ignored
altogether, while racist-inspired terrorism was white-washed. It has taken
almost a century to repair the damage caused by these earlier historical
accounts.
In 1933, Francis Butler Simkins and Robert HilliardWoody began the
project of repudiating the Redeemer myths." ' To be sure, Simkins and
Woody did not free themselves of the racist stereotypes of their time.Their
text is riddled with statements that betray an assumption of African Ameri-
can inferiority. Despite this prejudice, they still revised the story of
Reconstruction, crediting the predominantly African American Constitu-
tional Convention of 1868 with designing one of the country's most
progressive constitutions. Simkins and Woody concluded that the Conven-
tion delegates, "did not create 'the Negro bedlam' which tradition has
6. Eric Foner, South Caroliias Black Elected Officials During Rcconstruction, in AT
FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUC-
TION SOUTH CAROLINA 167 (James Lowell Underwood &W Lewis Burke, Jr. eds., Univ. of
South Carolina Press 2000).
7. 2 HISTORY OF SOtrU CAROLINA 892-912 (Snowden ed., 1920) [hereinafter
Snowden].
8. Id. at 907.
9. Id. at 947.
10. See FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS & ROBERT HILLIARD WOODY, SOUTH CAROLINA DUR-
ING RECONSTRUCTION (1932).
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associated with them."' Rather, the Convention was marked by the "sin-
cere and persistent desire of the Negroes" to create a liberal, democratic
state that would guarantee the right to a free education and the right to
universal, male suffrage. 1
2
Robert Woody deserves additional credit for repairing the reputation
of State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright. Previous accounts
of Justice Wright ignored his legal contributions altogether, instead em-
phasizing that he resigned from the bench while "under impeachment for
official misconduct."" In a short essay in the Journal of Negro History,
Woody resurrected Wright's reputation as an honest justice. 4 He ex-
plained that the impeachment charges were obviously trumped-up in
order to drive Wright from office and had no basis in truth. However,
Woody paid almost no attention to Wright's skill as a legal scholar, admit-
ting that Wright "evidenced considerable ability" while on the bench, but
qualifying that statement by saying that "all the important cases involving
novel points of law ... were decided by" the court's two White justices. 1
Still, Simkins and Woody succeeded in laying the foundation for
WE.B. DuBois."' DuBois' study, Black Reconstruction, proved to be
groundbreaking for two reasons. First, as a Marxist, DuBois highlighted
the class tensions between the African American proletariat and the White,
former slave-owning, planter class. More importantly, Dubois was the first
historian to directly attack the past Redeemer histories. DuBois remarked:
The whole history of Reconstruction has with few excep-
tions been written by passionate believers in the inferiority
of the Negro. The whole body of facts concerning what the
Negro actually said and did, how he worked ... is masked in
such a cloud of charges, exaggeration and biased testimony,
that most students have given up all attempt at new material
or new evaluation of the old, and simply repeated perfunc-
torily all the current legends of black buffoons ......
DuBois set to out to correct these egregious errors, but quickly grew
frustrated by the fact that "[1]ittle effort has been made to preserve the
records of Negro effort and speeches, actions, work and wages, homes and
families. Nearly all this has gone down beneath a mass of ridicule and
11. Id. at 105.
12. Id. at 104-05.
13. Snowden, supra note 7, at 898.
14. See R. H. Woody, Jonathan Jasper Wright, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, 1870-77, 18J.NEcRo HIST. 114 (1933).
15. Id. at 121.
16. WE.B. DuBois, The Black Proletariat in South Carolina, in BLACK RECONSTRUCTION
(1935) reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH 62 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 2d. ed.
1972).
17. Id. at 145-46.
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caricature, deliberate onfission and misstatement.'"' As a result, he vas
forced to rely extensively on the Simpkins and Woody text. Using the
evidence that they had compiled, DuBois concluded that northern and
southern Whites doomed Reconstruction to failure by abandoning the
African American majority. Yet, due to African American achievements
against all odds, it was "a splendid failure" nonetheless.19
In the 1960s and 1970s a new perspective appeared, this time from
modern revisionist historians like Joel Williamson. Williamson claimed
that his work "was a broad-scale and time-consuming revision of a classic
in revisionism: Simpkins' and Woody's South Carolina During
Reconstruction. "- Williamson succeeded in uncovering a mountain of new,
primary source documents. With this evidence at hand, he was able to
begin the process of effectively dismantling the myth of Reconstruction
as dominated by carpetbaggers, scalawags and incompetent, illiterate
former slaves. In short, he was able to answer DuBois' call for a new
history of Reconstruction.
One of the most important revisionist scholars to follow William-
son was Thomas Holt. Holt claimed that the failure of Reconstruction
was a failure of the African American political leadership to present a
united front.21 Employing a neo-Marxist approach, Holt explains that
"[t]here were subtle but distinct differences between the largely mulatto
bourgeoisie and the black peasantry, with the urban-based slaves and ex-
slave domestics constituting something of a swing group' 22 Holt argued
that because of their different socioeconomic perspectives, African
American leaders rarely voted as a unified bloc. In fact, according to
Holt's figures, African American legislators never averaged better than a
unification voting percentage of seventy-five percent.
23
This lack of unity became crucially important from 1874 to 1876,
when White Republican Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain sought to
expand his own political base, reaching out to moderate, native, White
Democrats. 2' A handful of conservative, African American Republicans
joined Chamberlain in the hope of forming an elite coalition of both
races.2' While the number of African American conservatives was small,
their number "when added to the four to six conservative white
18. Id. at 147.
19. THOMAS HOLT, BLACK OVER WHITE: NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH
CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 152 (1977) (quoting DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUC-
TION).
20. JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RE-
CONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877 vii-viii (UNC Press 1965).
21. See HOLT, supra note 19, at 224.
22. Id. at 17.
23. See id. at 148
24. See id. at 180.
25. Id. at 190.
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Republicans and the thirty-four Democrats ... could constitute a
winning coalition." 2'
It was the lack of solidarity among African-American legislators
fueled by socioeconomic differences that eventually allowed White
Democrats to take total control of the government and strip African
Americans of most of their recently won freedoms. The sad conclusion
was that "[firozen into inaction by the fear of defeat, decimated by
defections and deaths, the Republican leadership continued to be
weakened by internal dissension . . . ."-" Holt placed the blame for this
dissension on the conservative leaders. These politicians, who hoped to
form a coalition of well-educated Whites and African Americans, fatally
weakened the Republican party. Holt noted the foolishness of the
conservative unification plan. He concluded that native Whites would
never have accepted an African-American government, no matter how
responsive that government was to White South Carolina's concerns. "It
is much more likely that they would have chosen to make their peace
with a strong government, responsive or not.'"" Holt's thesis has
remained the dominant view of South Carolina Reconstruction. It has
achieved this status for doing something that no other prior history had
done: treating African Americans during Reconstruction as individuals
rather than as a homogenous bloc.
Following Holt's lead, historians have begun to study some of the
individual African-American leaders of Reconstruction in more detail.
Most recently, James Underwood and W Lewis Burke have put together
a series of enlightening essays on African-American lawyers in Recon-
struction South Carolina." One of the book's greatest contributions is
its rediscovery of Justice Jonathan Jasper Wright.
Going far beyond Robert Woody's essay are Richard and Belinda
Gergel's "To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden": Associate Justice
Jonathan Jasper Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina, and J. Clay
Smith,Jr.'s, The Reconstruction ofJonathan Jasper Wright.3" The Gergels have
done extensive research on the life and work of Justice Wright,
uncovering stories about his early education, 3' his rise to political and
26. Id.
27. Id. at 224.
28. Id. at 4.
29. AT FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN
RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA (James Lowell Underwood & W Lewis Burke,Jr. eds.,
Univ. of South Carolina Press 2000).
30. See generally Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 36-72;J. Clay Smith Jr., The Recon-
struction of Jonathan jasper Wright, in AT FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING
FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 72-90 (James Lowell Un-
derwood & W Lewis Burke,Jr. eds., Univ. of South Carolina Press 2000).
31. Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 37-40.
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judicial power, 2 and his role in the South Carolina election crisis of
1876 (where dual governments ruled the state while Democrat Wade
Hampton and Republican Daniel Chamberlain fought to establish their
legitimacy). 3 In addition, the Gergels present new evidence ofWright's
life after his departure from office and his death in Charleston of
tuberculosis." Their work provides the most thorough and detailed
account of Justice Wright's contributions to date.
Similarly, Smith's essay provides a detailed legal study of Justice
Wright, charting every opinion he authored. Smith analyzes Wright's
jurisprudential style, concluding that Wright was a classic legal formal-
ist." He discusses Wright's "unwavering deference to the binding
authority of precedent"3" and his willingness to yield to the legislature
in matters of statutory construction. 7 However, both chapters are too
fond of their subject. For example, Wright's support of a Democratic
candidate for circuit judge in exchange for White backing of his su-
preme court bid could be criticized as selling out to the party ofWhite
supremacy for personal political gain. Gergel however, favorably con-
clude that this event demonstrated Wright's "considerable political
savvy. 3" Again, to support the contention that Wright was an articulate,
forceful leader, they cite the Charleston Daily News, which stated "that
Wright was 'clear headed, [and] quick as a flash .... ." Apparently, this
favorable comment on an African-American legislator in a paper that
vigorously denounced 'Negro equality' raises no red flags for the au-
thors. It does not suggest to them that perhaps Justice Wright went
farther than necessary in appeasing the indigenous White population.
J. Clay Smith acknowledges that Wright "was more conservative
than he needed to be,' but he does not blame Wright for being overly
cautious." Instead, he concludes that Wright was "one of the finest legal
minds that the Reconstruction era, or any other, has produced."'" To
bolster this claim, he offers three short paragraphs on the "long-term
effect of Justice Wright's decisions. 42 He claims that because ninety
percent of Wright's opinions were cited by other courts, that Wright
had a long-lasting effect on South Carolina jurisprudence. 3 However,
32. Id. at 40-46.
33. Id. at 51-64.
34. Id. at 67-71.
35. See Smith, supra note 30, at 76.
36. Id. at 79.
37. Id. at 80.
38. Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 44.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Smith, supra note 30, at 85.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Id. at 84-85.
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Smith never explains how Wright's opinions were cited. While none of
Wright's rulings were ever expressly overruled, only eight of ninety-four
opinions were "directly followed by the citing court." 4 In short, Smith's
evidence is unable to sustain a claim one way or the other about the
staying power ofWright's legal contributions.
Wright's mere presence on the South Carolina Supreme Court was
monumental, but to name him as one of the "finest legal minds" over-
states the case. Wright was a conservative justice who stayed well within
the bounds of well-established legal reasoning for his time. Admittedly,
being the lone African American on the court must have made it diffi-
cult for him to reach beyond this safe legal ground. Still, his
jurisprudence cannot seriously be compared against that of John Mar-
shall or Learned Hand-geniuses who succeeded in using the existing
legal doctrines of their eras in order to revolutionize the entire state of
the law. Therefore, it is clear that a careful assessment of Justice Jonathan
Jasper Wright is in order. By comparing him to another African-
American lawyer, William James Whipper, we can critically and accu-
rately gauge the effect ofWright's contributions during Reconstruction.
II. WHIPPER V WRIGHT
Jonathan Jasper Wright and William James Whipper were well-
educated, freeborn northerners who moved to South Carolina at the
close of the Civil War. Wright was born in Pennsylvania as the son of a
runaway slave.4" Through his own success in the common schools of
Pennsylvania and with the aid of private tutoring from a local, aboli-
tionist minister," Wright attended college in New York, and then went
on to study law with a judge in Wilkes-Barre. 7 In 1865, he was sent by
the American Missionary Society to Beaufort, South Carolina to organ-
ize schools for the freedmen." Whipper was also a Pennsylvania native,
born in Philadelphia, the nephew of"a prominent, black abolitionist."5
Whipper left Pennsylvania for Michigan and received his legal training
in Detroit." He made his way to South Carolina as a non-commissioned
44. Id. at 85.
45. Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 36.
46. Id.
47. Woody, supra note 14, at 114-15.
48. Id. at 115.
49. ERIC FONER, FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICERHOLDERS
DURING RECONSTRUCTION 226 (1993).
50. J.R. Oldfield, A High and Honorable Calling: Black Latwyers in South Carolina, 1868-




officer with the U.S. Army and stayed as a teacher with the Freedmen's
Bureau."
In 1868, the two were among the first three African Americans
admitted to the South Carolina bar.s2 Once in South Carolina, both
Wright and Whipper became dominant Reconstruction political figures.
They played central roles in the constitutional convention of 1868, 53 and
upon the creation of the new government, they were elected to the state
legislature. 4 When a seat opened on the state supreme court in 1870,
Whipper and Wright quickly emerged as the two leading candidates."
The position was to be filled "by a joint vote of the General Assembly.
'5 6
Whipper had the clear support of the majority of the African-American
officeholders, while Wright was the overwhelming choice of Conserva-
tive Republicans and White, mostly northern-born Democrats. 5'7 During
a tense vote in the joint session, 8 Wright was elected, becoming the
highest-ranking African-American politician in the nation.
Whipper, an "outgoing, articulate and flamboyant ' 5' radical Repub-
lican, earned much of his support from former field slaves.6 11 While in the
army, he had been court martialed twice: once for gambling and a sec-
ond time for fighting with a lieutenant. His gambling apparently
continued throughout his political career. In 1875, it was rumored he
lost $75,000 on a single night of poker. Perhaps inspired by these ac-
counts, the White Democratic press portrayed him as "utterly corrupt."
In the 1868 Constitutional Convention, Whipper advocated
progressive, egalitarian measures, such as extending the right to vote to
51. HOLT, supra note 19, at 76-77; FONIR, supra note 49, at 226.
52. See John Oldfield, The African Anierican Bar in South Carolina, in AT FREEDOM'S
DOOR: AFRIcAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH
CAROLINA 127 (James Lowell Underwood & W Lewis Burke, Jr., eds. 2000); see also JR.
Oldfield, A High and Honorable Calling, supra note 50, at 272. The third African American
lawyer in South Carolina in 1868 was Robert B. Elliott. See Oldfield, The African American
Bar in South Carolina, supra note 52, at 127. Elliott became a prominent U.S. Congressman
from South Carolina and used that office to denounce Klan violence in the 1870s.:Elliott
was also a passionate opponent of political corruption. For his honest ways, he lost elec-
tions for the U.S. Senate and for State Attorney General. See Foner, supra note 49, at 70.
53. See generally CONVENTION, supra note 2.
54. Holt, supra note 19, at 108;Woody, supra note 14, at 117.
55. See Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 44.
56. S.C. CoNST. of 1868, art. iv, § 2.
57. Holt, supra note 19, at 188.White Democrats knew that an African American was
guaranteed to be selected, and therefore supported Wright as "the lesser of two evils." Id.
58. See Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 45 (noting that "[gireat beads of perspiration
stood on the foreheads" of the elected officials as they "bent eagerly forward" to hear the
vote tally)(quoting the CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Feb. 3, 1870, and the CHARLESTON
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 2, 1870).
59. Williamson, supra note 20, at 331.
60. See Holt, supra note 19, at 150.
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women."' The proposal was ahead of its time, and the Convention settled
on universal, male suffrage instead. Conservative Whites also frequently
accused Whipper of waging class warfare. To these charges, he responded,
"I want class legislation in favor of liberty, justice and equality as a
remedy for the evils of the past .... The white race have had the benefit
of class legislation ever since the foundation of our government.
' 2
Whipper's most dramatic fight came towards the end of
Reconstruction, when he struggled unsuccessfully to earn a seat on the
First Circuit Court in Charleston. In 1875, Radical Republicans
protested Governor Chamberlain's recent appointment of Democrats to
several government positions by electing Whipper and other Radical
Republicans to circuit court judgeships. 3 The Charleston News & Courier
reacted with strong, racist language. Under the headline, "THE BLACK
FLAG HOISTED!," the paper reported that "the Negro Ring" of the
General Assembly had elected Whipper to "the coveted Charleston
circuit."'' The editor of the News & Courier, Francis W Dawson, added
that Whipper, "a full-blood negro, who is known to be ignorant and
malignant, and is believed to be utterly corrupt, was chosen as Judge of
the most important Circuit in South Carolina."" '
Dawson had become a close friend of Chamberlain's,"' and used
this opportunity to publicly goad the Governor into action. He wrote,
"War is declared upon the honest people of South Carolina, whether
Conservatives or Republicans . .. And if the issue be met squarely, if the
people stand together ... the fight can be won."67 Chamberlain rose to
the challenge and declared that it was "a horrible disaster-a disaster
equally great to the State, to the Republican party, and greatest of all to
those communities which shall be doomed to feel the full effects of the
presence of... Whipper upon the bench."'8 Two days later, the Governor
refused to sign Whipper's commission."
Whipper sued Judge Reed directly in an attempt to gain possession
of his office, but his case was not heard by the supreme court until June
of 1877.7' By then the Redeemers had regained complete control of the
61. Foner, supra note 49, at 226-227.
62. Id. at 227.
63. See Holt, supra note 19, at 185-186.
64. The Black Flag Hoisted!, CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Dec. 17, 1875 [hereinafter
The Black Flag Hoisted].
65. Editorial, Whipper, the BlackJudge!, CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Dec. 17, 1875
[hereinafter ihipper the Black Judge].
66. Holt, supra note 19, at 183.
67. See Whipper the Black Judge, supra note 65.
68. Gov. Chamberlain's Views on the 'hipper-Moses Infamy, CHARLESTON NEWS & COU-
RIER, Dec. 20, 1875.
69. The Governor's Coup D'Etat, CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Dec. 22,1875.
70. Whipper v. Reed, 9 S.C. 5 (1877).
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government. Amiel Willard, who had been rewarded with the post of
Chief Justice after supporting Wade Hampton in the 1876 election,'
wrote the opinion of the court .
2 He ruled for Reed.7 3
After the fall of Reconstruction, Whipper stayed involved in public
life and became a probate judge in 1885.When White Southerners grew
tired ofWhipper's presence on the bench, they fixed the election of 1888,
thereby ensuring his defeat. However, Whipper refused to go quietly. He
declined to relinquish his official papers, and as a result spent more than a
year in jailY.7 After being released, Whipper would not fade away. Before
the 1895 constitutional convention, Democrats manipulated registration
laws to prohibit African Americans from voting. Despite the fact that less
than eight percent of South Carolina's African American, male population
could make it to the polls, 75 Whipper was elected to represent Beaufort,
South Carolina at the convention.
7,
In contrast, Wright was a conservative Republican" who actively
sought the support of Whites 8 such as the northern-born, Harvard- and
Yale-educated governor of South Carolina, Daniel Chamberlain.7 While
the Democratic Charleston Daily News had labeled Whipper's election to
the First Circuit as "The Crowning Infamy of Negro Rule,"" that same
paper considered Wright to be a "very intelligent, well-spoken colored
lawyer."" During the 1868 Constitutional Convention, Wright supported
a poll tax designed to fund the public schools. To critics claiming that a
poll tax would disenfranchise the recently freed slaves,Wright replied that
the poor should "smoke less cigars or chew less tobacco" if they wanted
to vote.' 2
After Reconstruction's demise, Wright briefly stayed involved in
politics, but not in the aggressive, defiant way as did Whipper. Instead of
fighting White Democratic control, he supported Redeemer Democrat
Wade Hampton during his gubernatorial re-election campaign of 1878.
Hampton, of course, was a plantation owner, former slave master and ex-
alted Confederate General who was "determined to reclaim his homeland
71. Holt, supra note 19, at 210-11.
72. Reed, 9 S.C. at 6.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Foner, supra note 49, at 227.
75. Ayers, supra note 3, at 289.
76. Foner, supra note 49, at 227.
77. See Woody, supra note 14, at 116.
78. See Holt, supra note 19, at 188.
79. Id. at 194.
80. The Black Flag Hoisted!, supia note 64.
81. Woody, supra note 14, at 117 (quoting the CHIARLESTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 9,
1868).
82. Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 41-42.
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from interlopers."" '8 When asked about Hampton, Wright proclaimed,
"There is not a decent Negro in the state that will vote against him.
' 4
Thus, Robert Woody accurately concluded, "Wright was a compromiser,"
who sought to form a coalition of well-educated African Americans and
White "men of experience.""
The split between Wright and Whipper is emblematic of the split
that developed within the Republican party during Reconstruction. In
1876, with the Democratic party in resurgence, the Republicans failed to
unite in opposition." As a result, the Republicans played a critical role in
their own downfall. Thomas Holt claims that the reason the Republicans
splintered was because of economic differences within the party.17 The
elite, well-educated African Americans who dominated the Republican
party leadership were too disconnected from the ex-slaves to adequately
represent them."8 Holt contends that in the waning days of Reconstruc-
tion, the elite failed to fight for the rights of the freedmen, and instead
vainly sought to forge an elite coalition with Whites."'
In addition to economic discord, there were also important legal
divisions. Wright and Whipper shared similar socioeconomic backgrounds,
yet the two differed greatly over their interpretation of the law. If
Whipper were a judge today, his critics would label him an extreme
judicial activist: someone who interprets the law broadly in order to
deliver justice to those whom the law has left behind. Whipper would
have justified his activism by reasoning that the existing legal system
contained a strong bias in favor of White supremacy. Therefore, it needed
radical change in order to provide equal protection for African-American
citizens. In contrast, the more conservative Wright believed that the old
legal doctrines and common-law precedents, "if applied with blinders on,
would eventually be fairly applied to all, regardless of race or class."'' By
adopting a more cautious legal approach, Wright surrendered
opportunities to secure African-American rights that Whipper would have
exploited.
III.THE REMNANTS OF SLAVERY
The law guided the decisions of Jonathan Jasper Wright and other
Conservative Republicans throughout Reconstruction. This fact became
83. Ayers, supra note 3, at 8.
84. Gergel & Gergel, supra note 5, at 68.
85. See Woody, supra note 14, at 116 (stating that Wright "exerted a moderating and
restraining influence upon the more radical colored members of the convention").
86. Holt, supra note 19, at 224.
87. See id. at 3.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 220-221.
90. Smith, supra note 30, at 85.
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vibrantly clear when political discussions turned to slavery. How to tie up
the loose ends of slavery's demise was obviously an emotional issue for the
former slaves and freeborn African Americans. Not surprisingly, one of the
most popular proposals of the 1868 constitutional convention was the
repudiation of all private slave debts.9 ' That is, any private debt incurred
for the purchase of slaves would be void. The contract for a slave sale
could not be enforced as contrary to public policy. But throughout the
debate on this proposal, Wright tempered the convention's well-justified
emotion with judicial caution.
The first ordinance the convention passed was to declare "null and
void all Contracts and Judgments and Decrees ... for the purchase of
slaves.' '" This ordinance, effectively a law passed by the convention acting
as a legislature, won nearly unanimous support." As Simkins and Woody
delicately phrased it, the discussion on this ordinance afforded the dele-
gates the "opportunity for the display of feelings against the former
slaveholders."' 4 William James Whipper gave one of the most passionate
and genuinely inspirational speeches on the subject. Whipper told his fel-
low delegates, some of whom had been slaves only three years earlier:
I am zealous to see this Ordinance passed, to see the last ves-
tige of that hated institution buried so deep in the sea of
oblivion that no resurrection air shall ever breach it in its
loathsome walls .... The facts are simply these: men in this
portion of the country, for a long period of time, had been
conniving at wholesale robbery-robbing, stealing, and sell-
ing human plunder .... We are told, also, [by opponents to
the ordinance] that this is a quarrel between two gentlemen
[the slave trader and the slave owner] and it is proposed to
let them fight it out. I am willing they shall, and that the
buyer and seller shall settle upon whatever terms they
choose, but I am not willing that the machinery of our
Courts should be used for the purpose of wringing the
91. See CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 248-49 (listing the yeas and nays on the private
slave debt ordinance, with 92 for and 19 against).
92. S.C. CONST. of 1868, An Ordinance Declaring Null and void all Contracts and
Judgments and Decrees heretofore made and entered up, where the consideration was for
the purchase of slaves.
93. See CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 248-249. See also A. A. TAYLOR, THE NEGRO IN
SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION, 130-131 (1924) (describing the "heated
debate" wherein "the majority of delegates agreed that the repudiation of these bonds was
absolutely necessary on the ground that it was violative of the fundamental principle of
moral law expressed in the Declaration of Independence").
94. SIMKINS &WOODY, supra note 10, at 99.
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bone from the two dogs. I ask, then, that we wipe out this
thing forever.'
While other delegates spoke with similar fervor,"' Wright adopted an en-
tirely different tone. He commented:
We are here, I trust, as I have already said, with hatred and
malice towards no man who has held a slave. I trust we are
here to extend the right hand of fellowship to all, and that
our hearts will be filled with the milk of human kindness
towards all. But we should repudiate these debts, [because]
... in the laying the foundation of a new government it
becomes our duty to have no litigation going on in our
Courts where the consideration is for slaves."
Thomas Holt might contend that Wright's words on this issue mark
him as an elitist attempting to build a future with South Carolina
Whites."9 On one level, Holt would be correct. Only a freeborn
Northerner could claim to hold no malice towards the former
slaveholding class. Yet there is an additional explanation for Wright's
perspective; as a legal formalist, he was particularly aware of the precarious
legal situation of the delegates. While federal law, through the
Reconstruction Act, guaranteed their right to assemble, a large population
of ex-rebels refused to recognize them. Wright observed, "I know it is said
by our opponents that we are an unlawful assembly, that we are an
unconstitutional body."" In addition, Wright had listened to the
statements of some of the White members of the convention who had
suggested that for South Carolina to repudiate private slave debts would
violate the Contracts Clause, contained in Article 1, section 10 of the
United States Constitution."' It states, "No state shall ... make any ... law
impairing the obligation of contracts."'"' Therefore, Wright counseled
caution: "We are not here to establish any new precedents," he advised." 2
He was determined to stay well within the bounds of constitutional and
common law.
95. CONVENIrON, supra note 2, at 230-31.
96. Id. at 214-249. Delegate B. Odell Duncan denounced slavery as "a crime against
civilization and Christianity" perpetrated by "the very scum of all lawless desperadoes, the
African slave traders." Id. at 215. Robert B. Elliott pleaded, "I hope we will vote unani-
mously upon this Ordinance, and put our stamp of condemnation upon this remnant of
an abominable institution .... this bastard of iniquity." Id at 227.
97. Id. at 218.
98. See generally Holt, supra note 19.
99. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 217-18.
100. See id. at 222.
101. U.S. CONST. art. 1, 5 10.
102. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 218.
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Instead of delivering a stirring speech like Whipper's, Wright
presented a staid analysis on the legality of the ordinance. He first noted
that slave owners had kept slaves under control by whip and chain, partly
in order to keep them from educating themselves.' 3 "This very fact:' he
stated, "is sufficient to show that those persons they held were men in
every sense of the definition of man.""" Once he had established that
African Americans were legally "men," he continued his analysis, asserting
"that there can be no property in man.""" Finally, on the basis of these
premises, he concluded "that whenever a debt was contracted, the
proposed consideration of which was a slave, there was no consideration
received, and where there was no consideration the debt was null and
void.'' 06
In other words, Wright justified the ordinance by applying well-
known common law doctrines of contracts law. For a contract to be valid
there had to be consideration: both parties had to offer each other some-
thing of value. Since there was no property in man, there was no
consideration offered by the slave trader. Since there was no consideration,
the contract was void. The slave debts were repudiated in Wright's mind
not by Whipper's passionate moral argument but by a rigid application of
the law. The distinction between Whipper's and Wright's rationales for
repudiating slave debts appeared again toward the end of the convention.
Both opposed a motion to place the slave debt ordinance directly into the
constitution, but they did so for different reasons.' "7 Wright's argument
was based strictly on a legal interpretation, while Whipper's plea was more
pragmatically motivated.
Defending his lack of consideration rationale, Wright admitted that
slave contracts "are contracts, whether there is or whether there is not
consideration."'" As a result, he stated that the ordinance might be uncon-
stitutional. Even more, he confessed that if the case were to come before
him as a judge, he "would be compelled" to find it contrary to the
Contracts Clause."" Therefore, he was reluctant to add the private slave
debt section to the state constitution, as the Supreme Court of the United
States might be called upon to decide whether the new South Carolina
constitution conflicted with the federal Constitution."" Wright did not
want put the entire constitution and the Reconstruction government in
jeopardy. If one questionable statute was held unconstitutional, that would
be a loss, but an acceptable one. If a section of the state's constitution was
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found to be invalid, the results could be disastrous. FinallyWright advised,
"We should leave this matter, then, as we have already acted upon it, and
let it go before the courts.'' '
Whipper saw similar constitutional problems, but he never worried
about the possibility of a constitutional provision being struck down by a
judicial body.12 Instead, he focused on winning over the voters of South
Carolina who would be called upon to adopt the new constitution.While
he had been "zealous to pass the [original] Ordinance, abolishing
contracts for slave debts," he adamantly believed that the ordinance should
be kept out of the constitution:
There are large numbers who zealously support the Consti-
tution we have framed so far, but who cannot do it with
that article attached. I hope therefore, as there is no necessity
for it, we will not burden our Constitution with a clause
that may, in a manner, have a tendency to defeat it."3
Despite their best efforts,Whipper's and Wright's arguments failed to
persuade their colleagues, and the motion for the new section passed.'
Added to article IV were the words, "All contracts, whether under seal or
not, the consideration of which were for the purchase of slaves, are hereby
declared null and void....'1 While Wright and Whipper came to the
same conclusion on this issue, they arrived there through different routes:
one rooted in legal formalism and the other concerned with the prag-
matic and political questions of establishing a successful government.
These different rationales would prove important as questions surround-
ing the legality of slave debts persisted.
It did not take long, as Wright predicted, for this matter to come be-
fore the courts in the 1870 case of Calhoun v. Calhoun."' In 1854,Andrew
Calhoun had purchased an 1,100-acre plantation with fifty slaves. ' 7 The
slaves alone were valued at $29,000."' Andrew was to pay for the entire
property, land and slaves, within fifteen years."9 He defaulted, and when
the previous owner, Floride Calhoun, sued to collect, Andrew claimed
that the Constitution of 1868 repudiated one hundred percent of his pri-
vate slave debt owed to Floride.""
111. Id. at 914.
112. Id. at 912-13.
113. Id. at 912.
114. Id. at 918.
115. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV,§ 34.
116. 2 S.C. 283 (1870).
117. Id. at 284.
118. Id. at 285.
119. Id. at 284.
120. Id. at 292.
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ChiefJustice Moses wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. 2 An-
drew Calhoun presented a series of arguments as to why the slave
contract was void. He argued that he had been sold a bad title to the
slaves, 1'2 2 that slave contracts should not be recognized for public policy
reasons,' 23 and most importantly, that the state constitution repudiated all
slave debts, public and private.
124
Moses rejected all of these theories.' 2 He held that the Contracts
Clause of the United States Constitution voided article IV, section 34 of
the state constitution.' 21 Moses pointed out that the contract for slaves,
when entered into by the parties, was a good contract according to law.
2
He held that it was "of the character of those [contracts] within the
meaning" of the United States Constitution.' 2' As for applying the Con-
tracts Clause, Moses quickly noted,"Where it is attempted to expunge the
whole contract, to make it 'null and void" it would be a waste of words to
enquire if the obligation was impaired."" Justice Wright concurred.1
3
1
At first glance, Justice Wright's concurrence was expected. From his
statements at the Convention, it is clear that he agreed with ChiefJustice
Moses that the constitutional language on the repudiation of debts could
not be applied, and neither could the ordinance repudiating slave debts.
However, he could have applied his own reasoning from the 1868 Con-
vention, where he stated,
We are not to recognize the right of our Courts to go on
contending and fighting over these matters. We should not
allow them to proceed bringing in their witnesses on each
side, and continuing the cases perhaps for half a century,
contending over slavery, and discussing whether one man
had the right of property in another man.' -'
However, Wright the jurist would be more conservative than Wright
the convention delegate. Most importantly, as J. Clay Smith has explained,
Wright was a strict legal formalist, and "[u]nder classical formalism it was
not within the purview of the judge to make any moral or policy deci-
sions.' 3 2 Therefore, Wright felt compelled to leave the policy decisions for
121. Id. at 291.
122. Id. at 302.
123. Id. at 306.
124. Id. at 301.
125. Id. at 301-07.
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the legislature, not the court. Beyond legal formalism, there is also the fact
that Wright, as a conservative Republican, wanted to be accepted by
Whites of both parties. Smith suggests that Wright "may have tried to
prove that the first black justice in South Carolina and the nation was not
a radical or pro-black."'33 This case came before the court during Wright's
first year on the bench, and thus, he would have been especially reluctant
to dissent from his White colleagues.
It is doubtful, however, that Whipper would have been so cautious.
He stated during the convention that he never believed a contract for the
sale of a slave to be valid. "Just so long then as man is not property now,
he never was, and hence there never was an obligation."'34 He pressed this
point on the convention, asking,"[I]s there a Court anywhere that would
enforce obligations payable to robbers, legalized though they might be for
the time being[?]"' 3 5 Whipper stated his point clearly. Any court over
which he presided would not enforce these obligations. Admittedly, it is
possible that Whipper, like Wright, would have been more conservative as
a justice than he was as a delegate. He might have bit his tongue and si-
lently concurred with the majority in Calhoun.
It is a near certainty, however, that Whipper would have taken a more
radical position than Wright on Russell v. Cantwell, an 1875 case involving
a lawsuit by a former slave against a White man.I"" During the Civil War,
James Cantwell had accused George Russell, then a slave, of theft.'3 There
was scant, if any, evidence against Russell, and he was acquitted. 3 After
the war, Russell, now a free man, sued Cantwell for malicious prosecu-
tion."' Cantwell's only defense was that Russell had no cause of action
against him since Russell was a slave at the time. The only person who
had standing to sue on the matter was Russell's owner, since he was the
only person wronged.
14
Justice Wright wrote for the court. 4 ' The question for the court was
whether former slaves had any of the natural rights of citizens before they
were emancipated. The constitutional convention of 1868 attempted to
answer this question with an emphatic 'yes' by repudiating all existing
slave debts. Since there were no rights of property in human beings,
1 4
2
slavery had never legally existed. Wright held to this belief during the
133. Id. at 85.
134. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 231.
135. Id. at 230.
136. 5 S.C. 477 (1875).
137. Id. at 477.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 478.
141. Id. at 477.
142. SeC CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 217.
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constitutional convention. "I contend that the institution of American
slavery never was a legal institution" he declared.1
3
But as a supreme court justice, Wright did not rely on his 'no con-
sideration' theory from the convention. Instead, as the law required,
Wright looked to the law at the time the wrong was committed. He
ruled,"lf the respondent was a slave at the time the act complained of was
committed, under the then existing laws of this State he could not have
brought this action .... "44 As a legal formalist, Wright felt he had no
choice. George Russell's suit was dismissed, since he had suffered no legal
wrong.'45 J. Clay Smith,Jr. has concluded that Wright's opinion in Russell
is a testament to his "ability to maintain his judicial integrity in the face
of sensitive, socially and politically divisive issues [and] is evidence of his
strength of character, as well as his pledge to uphold the law."'4"
However, Wright did bend to the political pressures from the White
establishment in deciding this case. Not only did Wright bar Russell's
claim, he went even farther when he concluded that "To permit those
who were slaves and are now free to bring actions ... for wrongs commit-
ted against them during the existence of slavery would prove disastrous to
all classes of persons in the State."' 41 Ironically, this reasoning suggests that
Wright was partly motivated by public policy, and not just legal formal-
ism. If slaves were allowed to sue for wrongs committed against them
while in slavery, then the courts would be overwhelmed by retributive
cases filed by slaves against their former masters, overseers and oppressors.
Additionally, Wright's reasoning is reminiscent of the rationale em-
ployed in the most infamous prewar case, Dred Scott v. Sal!ford.'4" In Dred
Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the
plaintiff, a slave who was asserting a claim that he had been freed, was a
citizen capable of bringing a suit in federal court.To answer this question,
Chief Justice Roger Taney adopted one of the classic methods of legal
formalism-originalist interpretation of the Constitution-and declared
that "The duty of the court is, to interpret [the Constitution] with the
best lights we can obtain on the subject ... according to its true intent
and meaning when it was adopted."' 49 After an extensive analysis, Taney
concluded that Dred Scott was "not a citizen ... in the sense in which
that word is used in the Constitution.""' The suit was dismissed.
Of course, Jonathan Wright would have denounced any similarity
between him and Justice Taney. Wright had once insisted that Taney, who
143. Id.
144. Russell, 5 S.C. at 478.
145. Id.
146. Smith, supra note 30, at 77.
147. Russell, 5 S.C. at 478.
148. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
149. Id. at 405.
150. Id. at 454.
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as a federal judge was appointed for life, should have been murdered after
the Dred Scott ruling. "If there is anything in this world that would induce
me to assassinate a person,"Wright proclaimed, "it would be because that
person was trampling upon the liberties of the people, and that he was
placed in such a position that he could not be removed in any other
way.' "s' Yet the similarities between Wright's "borderline heartless"'' 12 for-
malism andTaney's racist originalism persist.
Even more surprising is the fact that a legally formalistic approach
could have allowed Wright to conclude that Russell's suit was valid.
Russell's injury occurred in Charleston in July of 1864. While state law
might have considered Russell a slave, that law would have been trumped
by the federal Emancipation Proclamation,"3 which pronounced that
Russell, as a slave in an area currently under rebellion, was free. Wright
could have allowed Russell's claim to go forward while still limiting his
holding to those slaves who were wronged after January 1, 1863, the date
Lincoln issued the final Emancipation Proclamation. By limiting his
decision as such, Wright could have allowed the suit to proceed without
opening up the floodgates to a sea of endless slave litigation. Of course,
such a decision might have been legally defensible, but it would have
generated extreme political controversy It would have been an official
decree from the state supreme court that the former masters had
flagrantly broken federal law in treating African Americans as slaves after
an executive proclamation had declared them free. In this respect, it would
have been a direct affront to the former Confederates.
The fact that Wright refused to travel this route suggests that he
cared about more than just legal formalism. Wright knew a declaration
that Russell's case was valid would be seen as an insult to the White elite.
Not only would they have lost their slaves, but now those slaves would be
able to demand restitution for wrongs committed against them during
slavery. Considering that "slave reparations" in the 1870s meant repaying
slave owners for their lost property (not slaves for their lost wages), such a
decision would have been a radical, aggressive act by the court.
Whipper, however, might have embraced this opportunity. While
Moses and Willard would have written the majority opinion, Whipper's
dissent would have stood as a symbolic victory. As Whipper repeated often
during the convention, the existence of slavery had indelibly marred the
otherwise glorious reputation of antebellum South Carolina. He wished
to abolish all remnants of slavery, to treat all people, African American or
White, as equals, "not as a matter of expediency, but as a matter of right
151. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 599.
152. Smith, sipra note 30, at 85.
153. Abraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) rcprinted in 12
Stat. 1268-69 (1863). The Proclamation states that as ofJanuary 1, 1863,"all persons held
as slaves within any state or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in
rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free."
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and as a matter ofjustice .... ""', Therefore, while legal formalism required
Wright to look backward for precedential support, Whipper focused his
gaze into the future, declaring:
I hope we may establish a system of laws that will stand the
favorable criticism of a holier and brighter civilization even
than our own. For it is to be remembered that we are now
doing what is to go down to future generations, to be criti-
cised [sic] by ages that will judge us from the past."'
Even if Whipper had been reluctant to accept a pre-Civil War claim,
he certainly would have accepted Russell's 1864 case. After all, during the
convention, the delegates passed without discussion an ordinance repeal-
ing all "Acts of Legislation" passed after secession "pledging the faith and
credit of the State for the benefit of any corporate body or private indi-
vidual" unless the new General Assembly chose to ratify them. 1'6 Since an
illegitimate government in rebellion could not pledge money from the
state's coffers, Whipper could reason that the same illegitimate govern-
ment could not recognize slaves as property after the federal government
had declared them free.
Even more, the first section of the new constitution declared that
"All men are born free and equal-endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights .. . ."' The second section announced that "Slavery shall
never exist in this State ... .""' Therefore, the former slaves did not need
to wait for a declaration from Lincoln to be able to "defend[] their lives
and liberties .. .protectfl [their] property, and .... obtain[] their safety and
happiness." '15 God had granted them these rights at birth. In writing such
an opinion,Whipper would have been demonized by the former Confed-
erates. However, he would have been lionized by the majority of South
Carolinians, sixty percent of whom were African American.
IV THE HOMESTEAD ACT
Like private slave debts, the creation of a homestead law weighed
heavily on the minds of the delegates at the constitutional convention.
The question first appeared on the fourth day of the convention, " " and
154. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 231.
155. Id.
156. S.C. CONST. of 1868,An Ordinance To Repeal all Acts of Legislation passed since
the twentieth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty, which pledge the
faith and credit of the State for the benefit of any Corporate Body.
157. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, 1 (emphasis added).
158. S.C. CoNsT. of 1868, art. l,§ 2.
159. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1.
160. CONVENTION supra note 2, at 41-43.
SPRINc 20013]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
despite the early start, the delegates continued to fight over the exact lan-
guage of the homestead provision until the penultimate day."' In between,
passionate arguments on the floor grew so heated as to cause one speaker
to burst into tears."'16 The text of the homestead section finally agreed
upon read in part:
The family homestead of the head of each family, residing in
this State, such homestead consisting of dwelling house, out-
buildings and lands appurtenant, not to exceed the value of
one thousand dollars, and yearly product thereof, shall be
exempt from attachment, levy or sale on any mesne or final
process issued from any court.""53
Also protected by the section was a considerable amount of personal
property belonging to the head of the household; "to wit: household
furniture, beds and bedding, family library, arms, carts, wagons, farming
implements, tools, neat cattle, work animals, swine, goats and sheep, not to
exceed in value in the aggregate the sum of five hundred dollars ... 1.6"4 In
short, the section pledged to shield up to fifteen hundred dollars of an
individual's real and personal property from his creditors. The aim of the
provision was to help cash-poor South Carolinians retain their farms if
they became unable to pay their debts.
Homestead exemptions had swept through nineteenth-century state
legislatures in the 1840s and 1850s, beginning with Texas in 1839."'"
Twenty-four states, including nine Confederate states, had homestead
exemptions in place at the start of the Civil War. After the war the second
wave of homestead laws arrived. During Reconstruction, every Southern
state that had a homestead act expanded the scope of their laws' coverage,
often doubling or quadrupling their prewar dollar amount. In the case of
Texas and Georgia, the governments increased homestead coverage ten-
fold."' As the U.S. Supreme Court declared in comparing the two
Georgia statutes, "No one can cast his eyes over the former [antebellum]
161. See id. at 887-89.
162. Id. at 474. In the midst of the debate, Charles Leslie took the floor to state that he
wanted to craft a homestead law that served all of the citizens of South Carolina, not just
the freed slaves. Id. at 472. "1 want to see the white men and the black men ... all going to
the polls to ratify this Constitution:" he declared. Id. at 473.This vision overwhelmed Les-
lie, who concluded,"I am speaking for my people, for I love them with all my heart." Id. at
474. At that point, the convention reporter observed that Leslie "was so overcome by his
feelings as to burst into tears, and sat down amidst intense silence." Id.
163. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 32; CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 888-89.
164. Id.
165. See generally Paul Goodman, The Eniergence of Homestead Exeniption in the United
States: Acconmnodation and Resistance to tie Market Revolntion, 1840-1880, 80 J. AMERICAN
HISTORY 470 (1993). For dates when particular states adopted their homestead provisions,
see Table 1 at 472.
166. Id. at 472,492.
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and later [Reconstruction] exemptions, without being struck by the
greatly increased magnitude of the latter.""'" The only two Confederate
states without prewar exemptions, Virginia and South Carolina, added
generous provisions in 1867 and 1868, respectively. "
Thomas Holt acknowledged the importance of land issues to Afri-
can-American citizens.' "As with peasants everywhere," he wrote,
"control of the land was an issue they could understand and mobilize
around.' '7" A nineteenth-century northern observer similarly reported,
"The sole ambition of the freedman appears to become the owner of a
little piece of land, there to erect a humble home . . .,,7 But the issues
surrounding the homestead exemption extended far beyond the former
slaves, since the South's economic difficulties hit Whites extremely hard as
well. As Paul Goodman observes, "Before the war the planters' most valu-
able asset had been black labor; after the war 'the key to survival of the
plantations was the ability of the former slave owners to hold onto their
land: 172
The debate over land reform split on the question of whether to
design the provision so as to assist the former slaves only, or to adopt a
more universal approach that would help all South Carolinians,White and
African American.' 73 Specifically, the delegates wondered whether they
should restrict the clause to homesteads purchased after the ratification of
the constitution (which would leave White, prewar landowners without
aid), or whether the act must cover all homesteads, regardless of when
they were purchased.' 74 Most Republicans, both African American and
White, lobbied for the universal approach. 7 Conservatives like Wright
felt that such a clause offered the brightest possibility for a union with
elite Whites.' 76 Radicals like Whipper concurred, believing that White
support was necessary to win ratification of the constitution. On the
other side of the debate, however, were a handful of radicals who argued
for constitutional language that would deny the former rebels any
protection. 77
167. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. 610, 622 (1872).
168. South Carolina had actually passed a meager $500 homestead act in 1851, but
repealed it in 1858. Goodman, supra note 165, at 480.
169. Holt, supra note 19, at 68.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Letter from "A" to Editor, Orangeburg, S.C. (Sept. 8, 1865)).
172. Goodman, supra note 165, at 491 (quoting GAVIN WRICHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW
SOUTH: REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 84,102 (1986)).
173. See CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 452-506.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 452-77. Most of the debate on the homestead act is recorded on these
pages, which provides the transcript from Tuesday, February 18, 1868.
176. See id.
177. See id; Holt, supra note 19, at 131.
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As he had done before, Wright adopted a conciliatory tone in ad-
dressing the convention. He stated, "I do not, and I trust there is not a
man here who does cherish any feeling of hatred or malice towards any
person .... It is not for the black man or the white man, but for the
whole people that we should legislate. '" 7 ' But this politically moderate
approach was legally troublesome, because the federal Contracts Clause
was again at issue. '" A retrospective homestead exemption might impair
the obligation of contracts between pre-1868 creditors and debtors.
Therefore, if the delegates wanted to be absolutely sure that their work
would not violate the U.S. Constitution, they would have rejected any
homestead exemption covering antecedent debts.
Jonathan Jasper Wright demonstrated, however, that the legally for-
rmalistic road was not always the legally cautious one. Applying his well-
known, strict-construction analysis, Wright declared that "no Court can
order a sale of property of the amount exempted here and claimed as a
homestead, whether there is a judgment on that property or not.""'8 In
making this assertion, Wright drew upon traditional nineteenth-century
contracts law, which distinguished the obligation of a contract from the
remedy available after the contract was breached.'8 ' The convention could
alter the remedy (e.g., foreclosure on a homestead) without impairing the
underlying obligation in the contract to pay the debt.'
2
Whipper joined Wright in supporting the retrospective version of
the clause. But while Wright claimed to hold no malice towards the for-
mer slaveholders, Whipper was less magnanimous. He opined:
We are framing laws for the whole people, and are not to
consider the fact that the law protects the man who was
once a political criminal.We are not to refuse to pass an act
that will benefit the great masses of the people, lest we
should protect somebody in favor of secession .... There are
colored people in the State of South Carolina who have al-
ready obtained lands, who have property, and who desire this
protection ....
Whipper's language was a far cry from Wright's call for a constitution that
"shall be so broad and wide that all the people of the State can stand, live
178. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 463.
179. See U.S. CoNsr, art. 1, § 10.
180. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 465.
181. See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., TuE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 103 (Harvard University Press 1938).
182. The U.S. Supreme Court would later hold that this interpretation was unconstitu-
tional. See Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. 610 (1872); see also iqzfra notes 191-197 and
accompanying text. In 1868, however, the law remained unclear. See WRIGUT, supra note
181,at 103.
183. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 462-63.
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and flourish upon it."" ' Instead, Whipper seemed committed to the idea
of helping every single African-American citizen of the state, including
the handful that had already acquired property. If that meant crafting a
constitution that also protected the occasional secessionist, then he
begrudgingly accepted this cost.
At its core, Whipper's argument was political. Like many convention
delegates, he feared that the former Confederates would stand against the
constitution and refuse to ratify it. A homestead exemption represented a
tempting carrot to offer his political opponents. In Georgia, for example,
"white men who 'cursed the [Georgia state] constitution' . . . still voted
for it 'on account of its homestead provisions.' " In fact, "It was the in-
fluence of the present homestead that ratified the Constitution of
t868.*" '8 The South Carolina delegates, cognizant of the progress of other
states' conventions, 87 recognized their own uneasy situation. Delegate C.P
Leslie, for example, reported:
We have just received over the wire intelligence of the
defeat of the Alabama Constitution.We all desire to prevent
such a result in South Carolina. The Constitution of
Alabama is a good one, but they have omitted a homestead
law, and the result is a defeat by 15,000 majority. Write
down the word "Alabama;" spell it, dream over it, reflect
upon it, and let it be a lesson. '
As mentioned above,Whipper did not want to "burden [the] Consti-
tution with a clause that may ... have a tendency to defeat it."'"9
Therefore, while he chose the accommodationist route on this one issue
during the convention, it is probable, given his attitude towards the "po-
litical criminals" of the state, that he would have changed his viewpoint
once the new government was well-established. Other radicals, however,
did not wait to give voice to their most heartfelt opinions. Thomas
Robertson asserted, "I am not willing ... [to give] to the men who
brought on the war, staked their all on secession, and who have turned off
and driven the colored men, to whom they owe their property, from their
184. Id. at 465.
185. Goodman, supra note 165, at 494 (quoting an unnamed Georgia politician).
186. Id.
187. See CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 464-65 (comparing the South Carolina home-
stead provision to the Alabama section); Id. at 887 (noting the visit to the convention by
H.H. Sweet, a delegate to the North Carolina convention).
188. Id. at 473.
189. See infra note 103 and accompanyint text; CONVENTION, stipra note 2, at 913.
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plantations without a dollar," any protection under a homestead law."' He
concluded:
I do not believe in any resolution or law that is retrospective
in its operations.The men who made this war did not count
the cost; they did not care whose property was sacrificed.
They drove men like cattle into slaughter pens, and I want
to know if this body is prepared to relieve them at the ex-
pense of the loyal men of the country."'
Yet Robertson's opinion was shared by only a tiny minority of the dele-
gates. His passionate argument did not carry the day. The delegates voted
down his amendment that would have explicitly limited the homestead
act to post-1868 purchases, and instead adopted an open-ended provision
that left the retrospective question open for legal interpretation by the
courts.
The first case to wrestle with the dilemma was In re Kennedy."2 At is-
sue was whether the homestead exemption would protect a debtor who
had both incurred his debt and suffered an adverse judgment against him
before 1868. In 1863, a judgment "for $70,000, and upwards" was entered
against the estate of Richard Kennedy.'' 3 In 1866, a separate claim was
filed seeking the sale of Kennedy's entire real estate to pay the earlier
judgment. The claim was granted in 1868, and the Kennedy land was or-
dered to be sold. After this final judgment had been issued, Kennedy's
surviving children began a third suit to establish a homestead for them-
selves on the property. The case reached the state supreme court in
1870.194
Two opinions were filed by the court, one by Justice Willard, and the
other by Chief Justice Moses. Justice Willard applied the same contracts
analysis that Jonathan J. Wright had described during the convention.
First, he noted that the convention clearly intended the section to apply
retrospectively," Second, he distinguished the remedy from the obligation
under the contract. He determined that "a judgment is a mere right of
preference among purchasers and creditors. It is to be regarded as an inci-
dent of the remedy not in contemplation of the contracting parties. '
Therefore, it did not come under the protection of the Contracts Clause.
190. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 452. Although this author is not certain, it appears
that T.J. Robertson was White. Regardless of his race; however, his statements are useful for
understanding the position of radical Republicans in South Carolina.
191. Id.
192. In re Kennedy, 2 S.C. 216, 227 (1870).
193. Id. at 216.
194. Id. at 216-18.
195. Id. at 226.
196. Id. at 226.
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While Chief Justice Moses agreed that the homestead exemption
could "prevail against creditors on contracts existing prior to its adoption,"
he "entirely dissent[ed]" from the justice Willard's extension of "the ex-
emption against creditors holding judgments ... prior to the adoption of
the State Constitution.""" Therefore, since a judgment mandating the sale
of Kennedy's estate had already been entered, he believed that the chil-
dren had no claim for a homestead.
With these two justices split, the decision lay with Justice Wright's
vote. He concurred with Justice Willard, vastly extending the homestead
exemption's coverage. '98 Such a decision conflicts with the perception of
Wright as a pure legal formalist, "dedicat[ed] to the institution of law."'""
As mentioned above, applying the homestead exemption retrospectively
might run afoul of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But
Justices Wright and Willard were doing more than just applying the act to
a prewar debt. They were taking a final judgment against a debtor, and
allowing his children to go back to court and use the new homestead ex-
emption to effectively rewrite the judgment. To do so, they had to read
the Contracts Clause extremely narrowly-completely divorcing the ob-
ligation to pay on the contract from the obligation to pay on the ensuing
judgment. Wright's narrow reading of the Contracts Clause-both in this
case and during the 1868 convention-is unsettling, especially when
compared to the broader reading he gave the same clause in the slave
debts scenario. At the very least, this inconsistency suggests that policy
considerations trumpedWright's application of legal formalism.
Even more, the Kennedy decision potentially violated the legal doc-
trine of res judicata, which states that a final judgment on the merits bars
any further litigation on the same claims or issues. Res judicata is an an-
cient, Roman principle that was "certainly well-established in the United
States by the nineteenth century.'12111 In Kennedy, the creditors brought a
suit on the contract, which they won in 1863. Unable to collect on this
judgment, the creditors petitioned for the sale of the Kennedy estate in
order to pay for their decree. In 1868, they won this case as well, thereby
finalizing the sale of the estate. However, "[a]fter the decree for sale was
made" the children of Richard Kennedy 2" 1 "filed this petition ... praying
that a homestead out of the real estate of the testator be set off and as-
signed to them."211 2 It was this final suit by the children that should have
been barred by resjudicata.
197. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 226.
199. Smith, supra note 30, at 85.
200. Eric T. Dean, Jr., Reassessing Dred Scott: The Possibilities of Federal Powier in the Ante-
bellin Context, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 713,722 (1992).
201. The children, being in privity with their father on this claim, would be barred
from relitigating the issue,just as Richard Kennedy himself would have been barred.
202. Kennedy, 2 S.C. at 217.
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That a strict legal formalist like Wright felt no qualms about altering
a final judgment suggests that he was worried about the policy implica-
tions of his decision more than he was about a strict interpretation of the
law. By siding with Willard, Wright cast a clear victory for South Carolina
Whites. Few African Americans owned land in South Carolina prior to
the adoption of the state constitution, and even fewer had judgments
against them requiring that they sell their land. By extending the home-
stead exemption to cover antecedent debts and judgments,Wright helped
White, prewar landowners almost exclusively. To Wright, who had won
some White approval during his campaign for the supreme court and who
had enjoyed White support while on the court, voting with Willard would
have appeared to be politically promising. He could further endear him-
self to his White Republican supporters by construing the homestead
exemption to be as far-reaching as possible.
To the U.S. Supreme Court, however, southern states were too gen-
erous in their interpretations of homestead laws.The high court therefore
righted the situation in Gunn v. Barry, handed down in December of
1872 .21 Gunn involved the application of an 1869 Georgia homestead
statute to an 1866judgment against the debtor.2'4 Justice Swayne, an Ohio
Republican appointed by Lincoln during the Civil War, -'2- wrote for the
Court.26° Citing the Contracts Clause, he severely limited the retrospective
reach of any homestead law. If "the remedy is part of the obligation of the
contract," he held, "a clearer case of impairment can hardly occur than is
presented in the record before us. The effect of the act in question, under
the circumstances of this judgment, does not indeed merely impair, it an-
nihilates the remedy.
' '2 7
As for Justice Wright's distinction between the obligation and the
remedy, the Court reigned in that argument as well. "The legal remedies
for the enforcement of a contract, which belong to it at the time and
place where it is made, are a part of its obligation. A state may change
them, provided the change involves no impairment of a substantial
right."' 8 That is, a state might retroactively change the remedy available to
a creditor, but only insofar as the change did not impair "a substantial
right" embodied in the obligation. The obligation and the remedy could
not be wholly separated. While this opinion left some room for protecting
203. 82 U.S. 610 (1872).
204. See id. at 620-22.
205. GERALD GuNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW B-3 (The
Foundation Press, 13th ed. 1997).
206. See Gunn, 82 U.S. at 620.
207. Id. at 622.
208. Id. at 623.
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prior debts under a homestead law,' 1 it was now clear that Justice Wright's
support for altering past judgments was unconstitutional.
2
11
By allowing pre-1868 homesteads to be protected, land remained
tied up in White ownership, and, as some delegates to the constitutional
convention realized,"the colored man [got] no land."2 ' Unfortunately for
South Carolina's African-American population, only a handful of Radical
Republicans fully understood how closely access to land was connected
to political power. As Paul Goodman has commented, "[t]heir control of
land left prewar elites preeminent in shaping the region's postwar des-
tiny.' 2  In short, by taking a conservative, accommodationist perspective,
Justice Wright gave the planter class control of the land without a struggle.
With that control, White elites gained the power to block African-
American opportunities for advancement.
Had Wright voted with the Chief Justice in Kennedy and not ex-
tended the homestead exemption to pre-existing judgments, the situation
might have been different. He could have denied the Kennedy claim, leav-
ing undecided the question of antecedent debts. After the Gunn decision,
Wright could have used the federal precedent as authority for denying
claims to pre-existing debts as well. There is little doubt that William
Whipper would have voted this way. While he concurred with Wright
during the convention, he did so because he realized that a retrospective
homestead clause was the only kind that stood a chance of being ratified
by the state's voters. That is, Whipper remained faithful to his oft-stated
commitments to do as much as possible for the former slaves of South
Carolina. Once on the state supreme court,Whipper would have had less
need for a far-reaching homestead provision. Certainly, he would not have
sanctioned the one that Justice Willard approved, which did nothing for
South Carolina's African-American population.
Even more, Whipper might have gone farther and written an opin-
ion prohibiting the use of the homestead clause to cover pre-existing
debts as well. McKeowvn v. Carroll, an 1874 case wherein the court upheld a
retrospective application of the homestead protection, would have been
the perfect opportunity for Wright to pen such an opinion."' McKeowni
involved land that was purchased before the war and homesteaded in
1869.2 4 The creditor, Samuel McKeown, sought an injunction in 1872 to
prevent the children of the deceased debtor, who were now in possession
209. The South Carolina Supreme Court did in fact uphold a retrospective application
of the homestead exemption after Gunn. See McKeown v. Carroll, 5 S.C. 75 (1874).
210. See Cochran v. Darcy, 5 S.C. 125 (1874) (recognizing that Kennedy had been over-
ruled in part by the Supreme Court's Gunn decision).
211. CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 454.
212. Goodman, supra note 165,at 491.
213. 5 S.C. 75 (1874).
214. Id. at 75.
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of the homestead, from logging on it. 2'1 Wright could have supported Mr.
McKeown's claim for injunction on strict, legally formalistic grounds. As
the Supreme Court's Gunn decision made clear, invalidating the home-
stead claim was the only way to avoid problems with the Contracts
Clause. In fact, the plaintiff in McKeown cited the Gunn decision, thereby





However, Wright rejected this argument and concurred in Judge
Willard's majority opinion. Judge Willard dismissed McKeown's claim,
reasoning that the homestead provision should be interpreted as broadly
as possible. Without ever citing Gunn, he explained, "The object of the
Constitution was, clearly, to perpetuate in the judgment debtor or his
family ... the ownership as well as the use of the family homestead. We
are not justified in diminishing the force and effect" of this constitutional
protection."7 Had Wright applied Gunn and invalidated the retroactive use
of the homestead clause, the effect of his ruling would have been to make
land more accessible to the newly recognized African-American citizens.
Instead of shielding former Confederates from their creditors, Wright
would have created new economic opportunities for the freed slaves. Such
a decision would have marked the melding of strict, legal formalist phi-
losophy with radical Republican public policy. The results from publishing
this opinion might have been revolutionary.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that radical, progressive opportunities were available to
Justice Wright and that he declined to take them. As Whipper's deeds and
declarations testify, Wright did not have to follow the path of cautious,
conservative jurisprudence. Even staying truthful to his formalistic train-
ing,Wright could have recorded great victories for South Carolina on the
questions of slave debts and the homestead exemption.
The flaw with legal formalism, as the legal realist critics of the 1930s
made clear, is that the application of its principles does not provide a
single, unambiguous, "correct" answer. Rather, the doctrines of formalism
will point wherever a judge, depending on his political outlook, chooses
to aim them. As Felix Cohen cynically concluded in 1935, formalist
jurisprudence is simply "legal magic and word-jugglery; ' 21 8 it is nothing
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Wright's formalism, combined with his conservative political bias,
stubbornly guided him to pursue long-term White support. Wright
frequently reached out to the former Confederates during the
Constitutional Convention of 1868 and echoed Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address. He asserted, "We are here, I trust, as I have already said, with hatred
and malice towards no man who has held a slave.' '2 1' Like other
Conservative African-American leaders,Wright sought to form a union of
elite Whites and African Americans, Republicans and Democrats. In
pursuing this goal, he alienated the radical Republicans and divided the
party in two. The effects of this division would be the loss of political
power for Republicans, and the birth of a Redeemer regime underWade
Hampton.
Despite the failure of Reconstruction in South Carolina, Jonathan
Jasper Wright earned one of the greatest civil rights victories of the nine-
teenth century: he became the first African-American justice of any state
supreme court in a state dominated by a hostile, unreconstructed, White-
supremacist culture. In serving on the court, however, Wright adopted an
accommodationist approach that was doomed to fail.This fact was made
most clear by Wright's continued support for Governor Hampton, even as
the ex-Confederate campaigned for overtly racist policies. Had William
James Whipper won election to the South Carolina Supreme Court in
1870, he would have likely led African-American Republicans on an ag-
gressively egalitarian campaign through Reconstruction. Yet instead of
Whipper's legacy, we are left with Wright's cautious, conservative juris-
prudence and the unanswerable question about what might have been.
220. Convention, supra note 2, at 218.
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